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Abstract A path scheme for a game is composed of a path, i.e., a sequence of
coalitions that is formed during the coalition formation process and a scheme, i.e., a
payoff vector for each coalition in the path. A path scheme is called population mono-
tonic if a player’s payoff does not decrease as the path coalition grows. In this study, we
focus on Shapley path schemes of simple games in which for every path coalition the
Shapley value of the associated subgame provides the allocation at hand. Obviously,
each Shapley path scheme of a game is population monotonic if and only if the Shap-
ley allocation scheme of the game is population monotonic in the sense of Sprumont
(Games Econ Behav 2:378–394, 1990). We prove that a simple game allows for popu-
lation monotonic Shapley path schemes if and only if the game is balanced. Moreover,
the Shapley path scheme of a specific path is population monotonic if and only if the
first winning coalition that is formed along the path contains every minimal winning
coalition. We also show that each Shapley path scheme of a simple game is population
monotonic if and only if the set of veto players of the game is a winning coalition.
Extensions of these results to other efficient probabilistic values are discussed.
Keywords Cooperative games · Simple games · Population monotonic path
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1 Introduction
In many real life contexts, ranging from the formation of pre/post-electoral coali-
tions of parties to the formation of mergers and partnerships between firms, coalitions
form through a sequence of binding bilateral agreements. From among the numerous
examples of such coalition formation processes, we may single out the recent merg-
ers between the banks and between the consultancy firms that are observed in many
countries and the Oslo agreements between Israel and its neighbors. An important
characteristic of such coalition formation processes is the effect of the sequence of
agreements on the future potential agreements. For a coalition formed through bilateral
agreements may grow larger because the synergy/commitment obtained by a coalition
may create new agreement opportunities which are profitable both for the members
of the coalition and the agent which will join the coalition. Hence, the determination
of the sequences of binding bilateral agreements which will result in the exploitation of
the greatest possible amount of synergy is of both theoretical and practical importance.
The coalition formation processes which end up with the formation of the grand
coalition deserve particular interest. Because, first of all, in many situations (e.g., situ-
ations of increasing returns to size), the grand coalition is the unique efficient coalition
structure. Second, the formation of the grand coalition among agents which have com-
mon properties (e.g., the formation of the grand coalition among leftist parties) has
been the focal point of many branches of social sciences.
In this study, we will focus on the formation of the grand coalition through binding
bilateral agreements in voting/government formation situations. We aim to address
two important questions in this context.
(i) Which voting situations allow for the formation of the grand coalition through
binding bilateral agreements?
(ii) In these situations, which agreement sequences must be followed to form the
grand coalition?
We will address these questions by modeling voting situations by simple transferable
utility cooperative games. In voting situations, the voters’ incentive to form coalitions
arises from their will to increase their power to affect the outcome of the voting pro-
cess. Modeling of these situations as simple transferable utility games allows us to
predict the voters’ power to affect the result of voting by using appropriate values
for transferable utility games. Many values have been offered for simple games as
appropriate measures of voting power and the two most widely used ones are the
Shapley–Shubik (1954) and Banzhaf (1965) power indices. If we assume that each
voter’s voting power is predicted by such an appropriate index, then the sequences
of binding bilateral agreements which result in the formation of the grand coalition
boils down to the notion of population monotonic path schemes.1 Postponing a precise
1 The notion of population monotonic (Shapley) path schemes is actually introduced by Cruijssen et al.
(2005). This study applied the notion of population monotonic path schemes to a case in logistic and trans-
portation in which several firms with a strong synergy potential can create savings through cooperation.
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definition to the next section, a path scheme for a simple game is composed of a path,
i.e., a sequence of coalitions that is formed through a sequence of binding bilateral
agreements which result in the formation of the grand coalition and a scheme, i.e., a
power index vector for each coalition in the path based on the associated subgame. A
path scheme is called population monotonic if each player’s index does not decrease
as the path coalition grows. In this study, we focus on the Shapley–Shubik power index
as an appropriate measure of voting power. Hence, the two questions that we address
can be rephrased as
(i) Which simple games allow for population monotonic Shapley path schemes?
(ii) In these simple games, which Shapley path schemes are population monotonic?
It turns out that existence of veto players, i.e., a subgroup of voters whose unanimous
agreement is necessary to pass a decision, is required for the existence of population
monotonic Shapley path schemes and vice versa. Moreover, a Shapley path scheme
is population monotonic if and only if the first winning coalition that is formed along
the path contains every minimal winning coalition of the game. We also show that
each Shapley path scheme of a game is population monotonic if and only if the set
of veto players of the game is a winning coalition. We further show how to extend
these results to the class of efficient probabilistic values, generalizations of the Shapley
value introduced by Weber (1988).
Our study in particular provides an alternative prediction of what kind of coalitions
form in voting situations which differs from the mainstream prediction of
Riker (1962). Riker (1962) predicts that only minimal winning coalitions will form
in equilibrium. This idea has been the conclusion of many studies in the general
coalition formation literature based on the seminal noncooperative bargaining
approach of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and also the studies which analyze coali-
tion formation in voting situations that are modeled by simple transferable utility
games (TU-games) like Shenoy (1979). However, the empirical data on government/
coalition formation shows that among all coalitions formed after the Second World
War in European democracies only a third of them is minimal winning (Laver and
Schofield 1990). This study shows that a wide spectrum of coalitions including the
minimal winning ones can form as a result of binding bilateral agreements providing
an alternative point of view for the analysis and the explanation of the data.
Population monotonic path schemes (PMPS) are in the same spirit as popula-
tion monotonic allocation schemes (PMAS) for cooperative games, introduced by
Sprumont (1990) and further analyzed in e.g., Norde and Reijnierse (2002) and Slikker
et al. (2003). An allocation scheme for a cooperative game specifies how to distribute
the worth of every coalition among its members and it is called population monotonic
if the share of any player does not decrease as the coalition he/she belongs to grows
larger. Clearly, also a PMAS’s main concern is to ensure that no player is worse off
with additional cooperation between players. However, a PMAS compares the allo-
cations assigned to a coalition of players with every sub-coalition’s allocation while
a PMPS restricts the comparison to the allocations of path coalitions that are formed
previously. In fact, the existence of a PMPS is a weaker condition for a TU-game than
the existence of a PMAS because every path scheme induced by a PMAS is popula-
tion monotonic. Another difference between the two notions is that each allocation
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provided by a PMAS has to belong to the core of the associated subgame. However,
this may not be the case for a PMPS as we exemplify in our study.
The outline of this article is as follows. In Section 2, we will begin by introducing
the preliminaries about TU-games with particular attention to simple games. Section
2 also formally introduces population monotonic path schemes. Section 3 presents
the main results regarding the characterization of population monotonic Shapley path
schemes of simple games. Section 4 discusses extensions of the results to other efficient
probabilistic values.
2 Preliminaries
Given a nonempty, finite set of players N , a TU-game with player set N is a function
v : 2N → R with v(∅)= 0. A coalition is a set of players S ⊂ N and N is called the
grand coalition. For any coalition S ⊂ N , v(S) is called the worth of coalition S. We
denote the set of TU-games with player set N by GN . A TU-game v ∈ GN is monotonic
if v(S) ≥ v(T ) for every S, T ∈ 2N with T ⊂ S. A player i ∈ N is a null player in v
if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) for every S ⊂ N\{i}. Given v ∈ GN and S ∈ 2N , the restriction
of v to S (a subgame of v) is denoted by v|S and is defined by v|S(T ) = v(T ) for every
T ⊂ S. A game (N , v) is convex if a player’s marginal contribution does not decrease
if he joins a larger coalition, i.e., v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) for every
i ∈ N and S, T ⊂ N\{i} with T ⊂ S. We denote by (N ) the set of permutations on
the player set N .
The core of a TU-game v ∈ GN is denoted by C(v) and is defined as the set
of efficient payoff vectors for which no coalition has an incentive to split off from
the grand coalition, i.e., C(v)={x ∈ RN |∑i∈N xi = v(N ) and
∑
i∈S xi ≥ v(S) for
all S ∈ 2N }. A TU-game which has a nonempty core is called a balanced game. In
particular, convex games are balanced.
A function F : GN → RN is called a value. A value F is efficient if for all v ∈ GN ,∑
i∈N Fi (v)= v(N ). F is said to satisfy the null player property if for any v ∈ GN and
any null player i ∈ N in v, Fi (v)= 0. F is said to satisfy the null player out property
(cf. Derks and Haller 1999) if elimination of a null player does not affect the value of
the other players, i.e., Fi (v)= Fi (v|N\{ j}) for all i, j ∈ N and all v ∈ GN such that j
is a null player in v and i 	= j .
A TU-game v ∈ GN is called simple if v is monotonic, v(S) ∈ {0, 1} for every
S ∈ 2N and v(N )= 1. We denote the set of simple TU-games with player set N by
SN . Given v ∈ SN , a coalition S ∈ 2N is called a winning coalition if v(S)= 1 and is
called a losing coalition if v(S)= 0. A winning coalition S is called minimal winning
if there does not exist a coalition T  S which is winning. Every simple game v is
characterized by its set of minimal winning coalitions, MWC(v). A player i ∈ N is a
veto player in v ∈ SN if S ⊂ N , v(S)= 1 implies that i ∈ S. The set of veto players
of v is denoted by veto(v). It is readily verified that a simple game v is balanced if
and only if veto(v) 	= ∅.
Voting or decision-making situations in committees like parliaments can easily be
modeled into the framework of simple games by representing the coalitions which
possesses the necessary power to pass a decision as the winning coalitions of the
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game. This model enables the employment of values for simple games to measure the
parties’ power to affect the outcome of the voting situations at hand. Many values have
been offered for simple games and studied in the literature as appropriate measures
of decisional power, i.e., as power indices. We will shortly review the Shapley and
Shubik (1954) power index that arises from the Shapley value.
The Shapley value (Shapley 1953) is one of the most important solution concepts
in cooperative game theory and has been studied extensively. Shapley and Shubik
(1954) proposed to use the Shapley value as a power index for voting situations in





|S|!(|N | − |S| − 1)!
|N |! . (1)
The value assigned to each voter can be interpreted by using the sequential prob-
abilistic interpretation of the Shapley value which stems from a procedure to form
the grand coalition (which is described also by Shapley 1953) that yields the Shap-
ley value of the game as an expected payoff of each player. In this procedure, the
grand coalition N is formed by introducing the players one by one and each player is
assigned the marginal contribution to the worth of the coalition formed when she/he
joins the set of her/his predecessors. Hence, the value assigned by Shapley–Shubik
index is the probability of turning the coalition of predecessors from losing to winning
when the order of arrival of players is random and all orders are equally likely. For
further discussion of the importance of the Shapley value as an estimator of political
power and several examples of its applications, the reader is referred to Straffin (1994)
and Winter (2002). Lastly, we know (e.g., by Derks and Haller 1999) that the Shapley
value satisfies the null player out property.
An allocation scheme specifies how to distribute the worth of every coalition among




x Si = v(S)
for every S ∈ 2N \{∅}. Naturally, every efficient value for TU-games defines an alloca-
tion scheme where the allocation for every coalition is obtained by applying the value
to the corresponding subgame. The allocation scheme in which the Shapley value is
used as an allocation vector is called the Shapley allocation scheme.
Sprumont (1990) introduced the notion of population monotonic allocation
schemes. The notion of population monotonicity requires that the share allocated
to every player increases as the coalition to which he belongs grows larger. Formally,
an allocation scheme (x S)S∈2N \{∅} for the game v ∈ GN is population monotonic if
x Si ≥ xTi
for every S, T ⊂ N such that T ⊂ S and i ∈ T .
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Observe that if (x S)S∈2N \{∅} is a population monotonic allocation scheme (PMAS),
then x S is a core element of the corresponding subgame v|S (cf. Sprumont 1990) for
every S ∈ 2N \{∅}.
We are now ready to introduce the notion of path schemes for TU-games.
Let v ∈ GN . A path consists of a sequence S = {S1, S2, . . . , S|N |} of coalitions such
that |Sk | = k for all k ∈ {1, . . . , |N |} and Sm ⊂ Sm+1 for all m ∈ {1, . . . , |N | − 1}. A
path scheme specifies how to distribute the worth of every coalition on the path among
its members. Formally, a path scheme (S, (x S)S∈S) for v consists of a path S and a
vector (x S)S∈S such that
∑
i∈S
x Si = v(S)
for every coalition S ∈ S.
A path scheme (S, (x S)S∈S) for v ∈ GN is called population monotonic if it satisfies
the following conditions:
• x Si ≥ v({i}) for all S ∈ S and i ∈ S (individual rationality).
• x Si ≥ xTi for every S, T ∈ S such that T ⊂ S and i ∈ T (monotonicity).
A path scheme in which the Shapley value is used as an allocation vector is called a
Shapley path scheme. Clearly, the Shapley allocation scheme of a TU-game is popu-
lation monotonic if and only if all Shapley path schemes of the game are population
monotonic. We will illustrate the notion of Shapley path schemes and their properties
in the following example.
Example 2.1 Let N ={1, 2, 3} and v ∈ SN be such that MWC(v)={{1, 2}, {2, 3}}.
The Shapley allocation scheme of v is provided in Table 1.
It can easily be observed that the Shapley allocation scheme of v is not population
monotonic but that there are exactly two population monotonic Shapley path schemes
on the paths {{1}, {1, 3}, N } and {{3}, {1, 3}, N }, respectively.
Observe also that the game v has a unique core allocation, (0, 1, 0) different from
the Shapley value of v. So, in particular, the allocation prescribed by a (Shapley) PMPS
may not belong to the core of the associated subgame.
Table 1 The Shapley allocation
scheme of v in Example 2.1 Coalition Player 1 Player 2 Player 3
{1} 0 – –
{2} – 0 –
{3} – – 0
{1,2} 12 12 –
{1,3} 0 - 0
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3 Population monotonic shapley path schemes
We will begin with presenting a preliminary result which is useful in understanding
the structure of population monotonic Shapley path schemes of simple games.
Lemma 3.1 Given a simple game v ∈ SN , let S = {S1, S2, . . . , S|N |} be a path of
coalitions such that Sm ={i1, . . . , im} for every m ∈ {1, . . . , |N |}. Assume that the
first winning coalition along the path S is Sk , i.e., v(S1)= · · · = v(Sk−1) = 0 and
v(Sk)= 1. If the Shapley path scheme (S, ((v|S))S∈S) is population monotonic, then
the following must hold:
(R1)im (v|Sp ) = 0, for all m ∈ {k + 1, . . . , |N |} and for all p ∈ {m, . . . , |N |}.
(R2)i (v|Sk ) = i (v|Sp ), for all p ∈ {k + 1, . . . , |N |} and for all i ∈ Sk .
(R3)MWC(v|Sk ) = MWC(v).
Proof (R1) and (R2) On the one hand ∑i∈Sp im (v|Sp ) = 1 for all p ∈ {k, . . . , |N |}
by the efficiency of the Shapley value. On the other hand, by the population mono-
tonicity of (S, ((v|S))S∈S), i (v|Sp ) ≥ i (v|Sk ) for every p ∈ {k + 1, . . . , |N |}
and im (v|Sp ) ≥ 0, for all m ∈ {k + 1, . . . , |N |} and for all p ∈ {m, . . . , |N |}.
Hence im (v|Sp )= 0 for all m ∈ {k + 1, . . . , |N |} and for all p ∈ {m, . . . , |N |} and
i (v|Sk )=i (v|Sp ) for all p ∈ {k + 1, . . . , |N |} and for all i ∈ Sk .
(R3) Suppose on the contrary that MWC(v|Sk ) 	= MWC(v). Then there exists
a T ∈ MWC(v) such that T \Sk 	= ∅. But then  j (v)> 0 for every j ∈ T \Sk , a
contradiction with (R1). 
unionsq
We now provide a characterization of the family of simple games which allow for
population monotonic Shapley path schemes.
Theorem 3.1 Let v ∈ SN . Then v has a population monotonic Shapley path scheme
if and only if v is balanced.
Proof Let v ∈ SN be a simple game which has population monotonic Shapley path
schemes. Let (S, ((v|S))S∈S) be a population monotonic Shapley path scheme for v
such that S ={S1, S2, . . . , S|N |} and Sm ={i1, . . . , im} for every m ∈ {1, . . . , |N |}.
Assume that the first winning coalition along the path S is Sk . Obviously ik ∈
veto(v|Sk ) and hence veto(v|Sk ) 	= ∅. Moreover, we know by (R3) in Lemma 3.1
that MWC(v|Sk )= MWC(v). Hence, veto(v|Sk )= veto(v) and v is balanced.
Now, assume that v is balanced. Then, veto(v) 	= ∅. Let i ∈ veto(v) and consider
a path S ={S1, S2, . . . , S|N |} with S|N |−1 = N\{i}. We know that S|N |−1 = N\{i} is
a losing coalition. Then v|N\{i} is a null game and hence  j (v|St )= 0 for all t ∈
{1, . . . , |N | − 1} and j ∈ St . Also,  j (v) ≥ 0 for all j ∈ N , since v is monotonic.
So, the Shapley path scheme (S, ((v|S))S∈S) is population monotonic. 
unionsq
Theorem 3.1 reveals that, in the class of simple games, the existence of veto players
(or, equivalently, a nonempty core) is a must for the existence of population monotonic
Shapley path schemes and vice versa. We can interpret this result as follows. When
a winning coalition is formed through a sequence of binding bilateral agreements,
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we know that the restriction of the TU-game to this coalition has veto players, that
is, in this winning coalition, there is a subgroup of agents whose unanimous agree-
ment/involvement is necessary to pass a decision. We also know that the formation
of the grand coalition starting from this winning coalition via binding bilateral agree-
ments requires the remaining players to be null players. But, this in turn implies that
the veto players of the winning coalition are in fact the veto players of the whole game,
i.e., the game is balanced.
Next we turn to our second question of which Shapley path schemes are popula-
tion monotonic. We will show in the following theorem that the requirement that the
first winning coalition along a path has to include all minimum winning coalitions
of the game is both necessary and sufficient for the population monotonicity of the
corresponding Shapley path scheme.
Theorem 3.2 Let v ∈ SN be balanced. A Shapley path scheme (S, ((v|S))S∈S) is
population monotonic if and only if the first winning coalition along S contains every
minimal winning coalition of v.
Proof Let (S, ((v|S))S∈S) be a population monotonic Shapley path scheme for v
and assume that the first winning coalition along the path S is Sk . We already know
by (R3) in Lemma 3.1 that MWC(v|Sk )= MWC(v). Then, clearly, Sk contains every
minimal winning coalition of v.
Let S be a path of coalitions with Sm ={i1, . . . , im} for every m ∈ {1, . . . , |N |}.
Assume that the first winning coalition along the path S is Sk (k ∈ {1, . . . , |N |})
and Sk contains every minimal winning coalition of v. Now,  j (v|St )= 0 for all t ∈
{1, . . . , k−1} and j ∈ St since Sk−1 is a losing coalition. Also, i (v|Sk ) ≥ 0 for all i ∈
Sk since v is monotonic. We know that each player im (m ∈ {k +1, . . . , |N |}) is a null
player in v|Sp (p ∈ {m, . . . , |N |}) since Sk contains every minimal winning coalition of
v. Then, firstly, im (v|Sp )= 0 for all m ∈ {k+1, . . . , |N |} and for all p ∈ {m, . . . , |N |}
and secondly, one can easily show that i (v|Sk )=i (v|Sk+1)= · · · =i (v) for all
i ∈ Sk by applying the null player out property recursively. So, we conclude that the
Shapley path scheme (S, ((v|S))S∈S) is population monotonic. 
unionsq
In the light of Theorem 3.2, we can answer one other important question in this
context: For which simple games all Shapley path schemes are population monotonic,
i.e., which simple games have a population monotonic Shapley allocation scheme?
Theorem 3.3 Let v ∈ SN be a simple game. Then the following statements are equiv-
alent:
(i) All Shapley path schemes of v are population monotonic.
(ii) The set of veto players of v is a winning coalition.
(iii) The game v is convex.
(iv) The Shapley allocation scheme of v is population monotonic.
Proof (i) → (i i) Assume that all Shapley path schemes of v are population mono-
tonic. Suppose that veto(v) is losing. Then there exists a minimum winning coalition
S ={i1, . . . , im} with m ∈ {1, ..., |N |−1}. We know that i (v|S)= 1m for every i ∈ S
since S is a minimal winning coalition. Pick a path of coalitions S ={S1, S2, . . . , S|N |}
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with Sm = S. The Shapley path scheme (S, ((v|S))S∈S) is population monotonic by
assumption. Consequently, i (v)= 1m for every i ∈ S. Observe that there exists i∗ ∈ S
such that i∗ /∈ veto(v) since S is a minimal winning coalition and veto(v) is losing.
Then, there exists another minimal winning coalition T  N such that i∗ /∈ T . Pick a
path of coalitions S′ = {S′1, S
′




|T | = T . Now, the Shapley path scheme
(S′, ((v|S))S∈S′) is also population monotonic by assumption. Then, (R1) implies
that i∗(v)= 0 since i∗ /∈ T , a contradiction with i∗(v)= 1m as derived earlier.
(i i) → (i i i) Let v ∈ SN be such that veto(v) is a winning coalition. Then, all players
in N\veto(v) are null players in v. Hence, v is the unanimity game on veto(v) and
is convex.
(i i i) → (iv) See Sprumont (1990), Corollary 2.
(iv) → (i) Obvious. 
unionsq
Theorem 3.3 reveals that, in the class of simple games, the existence of a winning
veto player set is both necessary and sufficient for the existence of a population mono-
tonic Shapley allocation scheme. This result can be interpreted by making use of our
results on population monotonic Shapley path schemes as follows. We know that the
existence of a population monotonic Shapley allocation scheme implies the popula-
tion monotonicity of each Shapley path scheme of the game and vice versa. Then,
by Theorem 3.2, the existence of a population monotonic Shapley allocation scheme
requires the first winning coalition along each path to include all minimum winning
coalitions of the game. But this is possible only when the game has a unique minimum
winning coalition, i.e., when the set of veto players is winning.
4 Extensions to efficient probabilistic values
Probabilistic values, introduced and characterized by Weber (1988), are generaliza-
tions of the Shapley value for finite TU-games. These values keep one essential feature
of the Shapley value, they assign each player an average of his marginal contributions.
They, however, may fail to satisfy the efficiency property. We refer to Monderer and
Samet (2002) for a detailed discussion of probabilistic values.
Probabilistic values are formally defined as follows. Given N and i ∈ N , let PiN
denote the set of probability distributions on 2N\{i}, the family of coalitions not con-
taining i . A value F (defined on GN ) is called a probabilistic value (Weber 1988) if




pi (T ) (v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T )) , (2)
for some pi ∈ PiN for all i ∈ N . Here pi ∈ PiN can be interpreted as the player’s subjec-
tive evaluation of the probability of joining different coalitions. For example, the
probabilistic value which is defined by pi (T )= 1|N |
(|N |−1
|T |
)−1 for all i ∈ N is the
Shapley value.
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In the remaining of this article, we will discuss the extensions of the results obtained
for the Shapley value on efficient probabilistic values.
Let P((N )) denote the set of probability distributions on the set of permutations
of the player set N . Given i ∈ N and S ∈ 2N\{i}, we will denote by S,i (N ) the set
{τ ∈ (N )|τ( j) < τ(i) if and only if j ∈ S}.
If we think of a permutation τ ∈ (N ) as the order in which players enter the game,
then S,i (N ) stands for the set of orders in which exactly all members of S enter the
game before player i enters.
The following characterization of efficient probabilistic values is provided by Weber
(1988).
Theorem 4.1 (Weber 1988) Let F be a probabilistic value as given in (2) defined by
p ={pi }i∈N with pi ∈ PiN for every i ∈ N. Then F is efficient if and only if there





for every i ∈ N and S ∈ 2N\{i}.
Observe that probabilistic values are originally defined for a fixed player set. How-
ever, our analysis requires the values to be defined on every subset of the player set
under consideration because, for every simple game, we want to be able to compare
the payoffs assigned by a value to the players at every subgame of the game. We now
extend probabilistic values in such a way that the players’ subjective evaluation of the
probability of joining different coalitions will be consistent in the sense defined below.
For this aim we will define the restrictions of a probabilistic value to subgames.
Let F : GN → RN be a probabilistic value defined by {piN }i∈N where piN ∈ PiN
for every i ∈ N . For each S ⊂ N , the restriction of F to GS is denoted by FS and





piN (T ∪ T ′), (4)
for all T ⊂ S\{i}.
We first illustrate the notion of the restriction of a probabilistic value in the following
example.
Example 4.1 Let F be a probabilistic value on N ={1, 2, 3}. Assume that F is defined
by the following subjective evaluations of players.
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p1N ({2, 3}) =
5
16
, p1N ({2}) =
1
16
, p1N ({3}) =
4
16




p2N ({1, 3}) =
8
16
, p2N ({1}) =
2
16
, p2N ({3}) =
4
16




p3N ({1, 2}) =
3
16
, p3N ({1}) =
4
16
, p3N ({2}) =
1
16




F satisfies (3) by taking the following probability distribution on the set of permuta-
tions on the player set:
b(123) = 2
16
, b(132) = 4
16
, b(213) = 1
16
, b(231) = 1
16






Hence F is efficient.




= p1N ({2}) + p1N ({2, 3}) and p1S(∅) =
5
8




= p2N ({1}) + p2N ({1, 3}) and p2S(∅) =
3
8
= p2N (∅) + p2N ({3}).
Notice that FS can be described via (3) by taking
b(12) = 5
8
and b(21) = 3
8
.
So FS is an efficient probabilistic value on GS .
In the previous example, we have shown that the specific restriction under consid-
eration is again an efficient probabilistic value. Indeed, every restriction of an efficient
probabilistic value is an efficient probabilistic value for the corresponding subgame
as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1 Let F be an efficient probabilistic value defined by {piN }i∈N where
piN ∈ PiN for every i ∈ N. Then, FS is an efficient probabilistic value for every S ⊂ N,
S 	= ∅.
Proof By Theorem 4.1 there exists b ∈ P((N )) such that piN (T )=
∑
τ∈T,i (N ) b(τ )
for every i ∈ N and T ∈ 2N\{i}. Take S ⊂ N , S 	= ∅. Given τ ∈(N ), τ|S denotes the
restriction of τ to S, i.e., τ|S =π for some π ∈ (S) with π(i) < π( j) if and only if
τ(i) < τ( j), for all i, j ∈ S. We can induce a probability distribution c on (S)




b(τ ), for all π ∈ (S). (5)
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(T ∪T ′),i (N ) =
⋃
π∈T,i (S)
{τ ∈ (N )|τ|S = π}. (6)
Notice that
(T ∪T ′),i (N ) ∩ (T ∪T ′′),i (N ) = ∅ for every T ′, T ′′ ⊂ N\S with T ′ 	= T ′′
and
{τ ∈ (N )|τ|S = π} ∩ {τ ∈ (N )|τ|S = π ′} = ∅






















where the first equality follows from (4) and the last but one equality follows from (6)
and the remarks below it. Then, Theorem 4.1 implies that FS is an efficient probabilistic
value on GS . 
unionsq
Having defined the restrictions of probabilistic values, we can now illustrate the
path schemes associated with these values in the following example.
Example 4.2 Consider the probabilistic value F defined in Example 4.1 and let
v ∈SN with N ={1, 2, 3} be defined by MWC(v)={{1, 2}, {2, 3}}. From Table 2
it can easily be observed that this balanced game has two population monotonic
F-path schemes related to the paths {{1},{1,3},N} and {{3},{1,3},N}.
The following theorem states that the results for population monotonic Shapley
path schemes in fact can be extended to all efficient probabilistic values which are
defined by strictly positive subjective evaluations of joining different coalitions for
each player.
Theorem 4.2 Let F : GN → RN be an efficient probabilistic value defined by {piN }i∈N
with piN > 0 for all i ∈ N. Then
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Table 2 The restrictions of F
for v and its subgames in
Example 4.2
Coalition Player 1 Player 2 Player 3
{1} 0 – –
{2} – 0 –
{3} – – 0
{1,2} 3/8 5/8 –
{1,3} 0 – 0
{2,3} – 6/8 2/8
N 1/16 14/16 1/16
Table 3 The restrictions of F
for v and its subgames in
Example 4.3
Coalition Player 1 Player 2 Player 3
{1} 0 – –
{2} – 0 –
{3} – – 0
{1,2} 1/2 1/2 –
{1,3} 1/2 – 1/2
{2,3} – 1/2 1/2
N 1/2 1/2 0
1. A simple game v ∈ SN has a population monotonic F-path scheme if and only if
v is balanced.
2. Let v be balanced. Then an F-path scheme (S, (FS(v|S))S∈S) is population mono-
tonic if and only if the first winning coalition along S contains every minimal
winning coalition of v.
3. Let v ∈ SN be a simple game. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(a) All F-path schemes of v are population monotonic.
(b) The set of veto players of v is a winning coalition.
(c) The game v is convex.
(d) The F-allocation scheme of v, (FS(v|S))S∈2N \{∅}) is population monotonic.
The proof of Theorem 4.2 is similar to the proofs of Theorems 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3,
respectively and is therefore omitted.
It is important at this point to observe that if for an efficient probabilistic value F ,
piN (S)= 0 for some i ∈ N and S ∈ 2N\{i}, then an unbalanced simple game may have
population monotonic F-path schemes. This is illustrated in Example 4.3.





for all S ⊂ N\{1}; p2N (S)=
1
4
for all S ⊂ N\{2} and
p3N ({1, 2})= p3N (∅)=
1
2
, p3N ({1})= p3N ({2})= 0.
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Consider v ∈ SN defined by MWC(v)={{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}. Clearly veto(v)=∅.
However, v has population monotonic F-path schemes related to the paths {{1}, {1, 2},
N } and {{2}, {1, 2}, N } as can be seen in Table 3.
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